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Opposites
Bruce Morito, University of Athabasca
Abstract: Irony appears to be deeply rooted in the practice of ethics. Attempts to prescribe morally obligatory duties,
and to will morally justified actions, often bring about the opposite of their intended result. Imposing imperatives,
e.g., justice, in efforts to produce fair, equitable, caring societies, inadvertently plants seeds of failure. The
imposition of moral imperatives increasingly appears to generate polarities rather than unities, as cases of abortion,
euthanasia, reactions to liberal immigration, and environmental protection policies have illustrated. Imposed
imperatives generate counter imperatives and counterclaims of having justice on “our” side. I attempt here to explain
this phenomenon and, in the process, argue that attempts to resolve such conflicts by defending one’s position
against its opposition is, in a certain way, destructive of moral life. I conclude with a sketch of how an ethic of
attunement can help rectify this problem.
Bruce Morito is Professor of Philosophy at Athabasca University, Athabasca, Alberta, Canada. His main areas of
research and writing can generally be described as practical ethics with emphasis on environmental philosophy and
issues pertaining to Indigenous people/Crown relations. He is especially interested in how matters of worldview
(metaphysics), value theory, personhood, and mind bear on these topics.

Irony appears to be deeply rooted in the practice of ethics. Attempts to prescribe morally
obligatory duties, and to will morally justified actions, often bring about the opposite of their
intended result. Imposing imperatives, e.g., justice, in efforts to produce fair, equitable, caring
societies, inadvertently plants seeds of failure. The imposition of moral imperatives increasingly
appears to generate polarities, rather than unities, as cases of abortion, euthanasia, reactions to
liberal immigration, and environmental protection policies have illustrated. Imposed imperatives
generate counter imperatives, and counter-claims of having justice on “our” side. I attempt here
to understand this phenomenon and, in the process, argue that attempts at resolving such
conflicts by defending one side over its opposition to others is, in certain ways, destructive of
moral life. I conclude with a sketch of how a different approach can be formed.
The idea that opposites produce one another is traceable in the West to Platonic thought
in the Phaedo (Plato, 1973:70e ff), to Hegel (1979) and his view of the dialectic between
opposites, and in the East to Taoism (theory of yin/yang). The dominant traditions in ethics and

41

moral theory, however, have paid little attention to this view of how the world works, resulting, I
want to argue, in misunderstanding the consequences of imposing imperatives and how this
results in large-scale moral failure, describable as rebellion (inversion of moral values), reversal
(turning moral principles against accusers), and hypocrisy.
Two kinds of oppositional relations are relevant here. The first involves the opposition
between ideal and real, an artifactual opposition; the second involves natural opposites. The
former is constructed whereas the latter is comprised of “givens” or basic facts of life. Failure to
understand how these oppositions play out, results in a blindness to actual lines of causality that
operate in motivational systems. To set the stage for understanding how this occurs, a brief
summary of the history of moral scepticism – the denial that moral commitments to principles of
justice can be the motivations for action – discloses how such causal connections have come to
be ignored by moral prescriptivists. Moral scepticism goes back at least to the ThrasymachusSocrates exchange, (Plato, Republic, 338c ff) and “The Ring of Gyges” (359a ff), in response to
which Socrates attempts to show that rational agents can actually act on commitments to justice,
as such, once they know and understand justice. Socrates refuses to admit that a person can know
what justice is and not act on it; he refuses to admit the possibility of akrasia or weakness of will
(Plato, Protagoras, 358d). Failure to act justly must, then, be a matter of ignorance.
This response seems rather naive today, but even Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics, Bk.
VII:1-10) had his doubts, arguing that moral failure is more a problem of opinion interfering with
the knowledge of justice one has. His explanation admits that other-than-moral ideas and forces
can interfere with the knowledge one has, which assumes a more complicated and nuanced moral
psychology than that of Socrates. Later, Hume challenges the underlying belief that reason can
cause action in and of itself, when he attempts to show that it is a mere slave of the passions.
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Kant, being awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, dedicated two major works to
recovering something of the Socratic measure of moral authority and efficacy. Others have
responded, in turn. Nietzsche (On The Geneology of Morals,1:7 ) for instance, declared that
ethics is the product of a slave mentality, determined to exact revenge on the powerful. It derives
from resentiment (1:10), or anger and the need for revenge, not reason.
In the 20th century, logical positivists regarded ethics (normative pretensions) as
nonsense, like metaphysics, deeming both to be little more than emotional expression, and
supported the behaviourist project of eliminating ethics (and practical reason) from explanations
of human behaviour. Capping off the eliminativist program, B.F. Skinner (Beyond Freedom and
Dignity) argued that ethics should have no place in the ordering of human relations. Ethics
should be replaced by stimulus-response mechanical means to engineer behaviour.
The history of Western moral thought can be described as a debate over the motivational
efficacy of ethics and the ontological status of moral agents. It has been, among other things, a
debate over the lines of causality relevant to the control of action. Over this history, traditional
prescriptive ethicists have faced a gradual erosion of supposed solid foundations, established by
a priori reasoning and knowledge. Being ignorant of the actual physical conditions that made
rational thought possible, moral agency (e.g., causally independent reason, rationally determined
will, a priori determination of moral concepts, persons as rational repositories of intrinsic value),
could be conceived as independent of physical conditions. As counter-evidence from
neurophysiology, psychology and sociology has arisen to support the sceptic, however, these
foundations have eroded.
Consequently, claims and assumptions by prescriptivists that persons can act
independently of these physical conditions have become increasingly dogmatic. Further, with
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developments in areas such as artificial intelligence, complexity, emergence and chaos theories,
alternative explanations of personhood are being formulated, which, in turn, obviate the need to
make references to radically free wills as determinants of action. The associated belief that our
moral agency is connected to something like intrinsic value, which justifies treating ourselves as
somehow independent of the natural, causal order of merely instrumentally valuable beings, must
also be asserted dogmatically. To the extent that we accept evolutionary and ecological theories
– the view that everything is the result of long historical processes and exists as a consequence of
the inter-relatedness of all things – moral theories that assign human moral agents special powers
(causal status) and value independent of natural processes, are being exposed as constructions,
whose justifications are losing force. Thus, as prescriptivists continue to assert that persons have
capacities to know and act on moral imperatives that they do not actually have, we can begin to
see why imposing moral imperatives engenders reversals, inversions and hypocrisy.
To see how the structure of traditional moral thinking produces the opposite of what it
intends, a critique of Kant’s attempt at a comprehensive and rigorous defence of moral
prescriptivism helps identify central factors. His is a construction (to him, a discovery) of an
ideal rational world, operating independently of the world of natural (phenomenal/physical and
psychological) causes, “the mechanism of nature.” In both the Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals (Kant, 1976) and the Critique of Practical Reason (Kant, 1956), he argues that the
rational mind can determine moral imperatives independently of the mechanism; hence, practical
reason can be “pure.” After formulating the categorical imperative, as derived from pure
practical reason alone, he proceeds to show how moral agency works, or how pure practical
reason can have a causal effect in the phenomenal realm. Since the separation of pure practical
reason from the mechanism of nature implies an incommensurability between the intellectual and
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sensuous or phenomenal, like Plato’s soul/body and Descartes’ mind/body incommensurability,
Kant encounters the interaction problem. How can fundamentally different realms have any
connection, especially of a causal nature? For Kant, a one-way causal connection from reason to
the mechanism of nature exists by way of the will (Wille), which determines action in the
phenomenal realm. Moral agents, then, not only must, but can override non-moral motivations.
As rational determiners of the will, persons are causal agents, who not only compel their internal
mechanisms of nature to conform to the principle of universalizability, but they must and can
treat themselves and other agents as ends-in-themselves, whose duty is to construct a kingdom of
ends on the Earth. These duties and values do not admit of compromise with other motivations
and values (instrumental).
Kant, however, admits that we cannot prove that pure practical reason is that which
determines a particular action. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he recognizes that pure
practical reason cannot cause anything in the phenomenal realm in and by itself, precisely
because it is detached from the phenomenal. It requires an intermediary, similarly to how pure
reason requires an intermediary (the schemata) to connect the categories of pure reason to the
sensory realm in The Critique of Pure Reason (1929, B177/A138-B178/A139). Kant must show
how a one-way causal connection is possible between the pure and the phenomenal realms. He
does this through reference to the typic (1956, 70-74]. As mediator, the typic enables principles
to be applied through acts of pure will, but no evidence can ever prove that reason causes action
through an act of pure will to anyone (even to ourselves). This is as it must be, since there can be
no mechanism connecting the phenomenal to pure reason, and therefore no evidence-based proof
of a causal connection. As he puts it, the moral law has only to do with the abstract notion of
freedom, which makes no reference to natural (phenomenal) connections. The typic, then, is only
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a presentation of the idea of law, in the most general sense, to the senses, not a body of concrete
evidence demonstrating that reason causes action in and by itself. In the end, how the moral law
“can be the direct determining ground of the will ... is an insoluble problem for the human
reason” (1956, 75). Hence, we never know whether it is the categorical imperative, or some
hypothetical imperative, that determines action. Shocking as this conclusion may be to Kantians,
it is a logical consequence of Kant’s argument.
I have dwelt on Kantian prescriptivism in order to identify the explanatory and
justificatory gap that persists in pure and ideal world thinking, to make clear why proponents of
the view must at some point assert that we can in fact act on pure ideal imperatives. The
interaction problem, which looked more like a puzzle from Socratic or Cartesian perspectives,
for Kant is an increasingly difficult problem in the face of developing physical and psychological
theories. His attempt at a systematic and rigorous justification and admission that interaction
remains an insoluble problem demonstrates why, as the notion of the a priori loses purchase,
prescriptivists must become increasingly dogmatic about our ability to obey imperatives.
What else has supported the prescriptivist’s confidence that persons can follow ideal
world prescriptions? First, although not universal, this structure of prescriptive moral theorizing
is ubiquitous. A description of these other expressions helps illustrate what gives confidence in
prescriptivism. It is connected to absolutist sensibilities, which seem to obviate the need to solve
the interaction problem. Kant’s was a reference to an absolute ideal of pure reason, much like
Socrates’ appeal to some pure form of reason sourced in an absolute Good. Hinduism similarly
holds Brahman to be the Absolute. Brahman assigns human beings duties which. according to
Krishna (the manifest form of Brahman) in the Bhagavad Gita, (Mascaro, 1962, Chapter 3),
override and counter the influences of the gunas (desires, passions). Our higher (pure) natures
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call us to renounce these lower aspects of life (of utilitarian value only), in much the same way
as Kant (and Socrates) calls us to apply the pure moral law over and against desire and emotion.
Krishna is describing a pure realm whose dictates cannot admit compromise with lower order
forces. While not admitting of influence by the lower realms, pure moral forces emanating from
Brahman can command human beings to act. Krishna appeals to this metaethical framework to
demonstrate that Arjuna has a duty to fight for his sovereign, to kill other arguably legitimate
claimants to the throne, even though some of those whom he is obligated to kill are his relatives
and loved ones. Given that the sovereign gained his seat on the throne through less than virtuous
means (a broken promise), the only reason Arjuna has for listening to Krishna is the absolute
authority of Brahman. In the end, Arjuna is not rationally convinced by Krishna but simply
overwhelmed by the force and sublimity of Brahman. Something like this seems to operate in the
mind of the prescriptivist: the force of the idea of the moral law is so impressive and formidable,
because backed by an absolute, that there is no need ultimately to justify that the gap between
realms can be bridged.
In the challenges to Confucianism, similar debates play out, but in a way that helps lead
the discussion specifically toward the theme of opposites. As in the West, metaethical issues
concerning personhood and agency are raised in response to Confucian claims that ren can
override base desires and other lower order motivations, deriving as it does from some higher
authority (Heaven) (Confucius, 1989, Book II, VII). Albeit not as radical as in Kantian/Hindu
ethics, persons belong to a different order from that of other creatures and their lower natures. In
emulating the chun-tzu (gentleman), human beings have the power to override their lower
desires. While Confucius thought it unnecessary to engage in metaethical justification for this
claim, his follower, Mencius, did not. Mencius faced Thrasymachus-like challenges by critics
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like Kao Tzu, who rejected the claim that there are moral motivations that can operate
independently of desire and (natural) forces (Mencius, 1970, Book 6: 4). Mencius’ response is
that ren is not “natural,” in the sense that everyone ordinarily acts on and from it, although it is
natural, in the sense that we are born with it. The capacity has to be awakened and nurtured.
Ultimately, the capacity originates in a higher-order, transcendent source, giving us the power
uncompromisingly to override earthly forces, without, in turn, being subject to Earth’s forces.
Again, ultimately, it appears that belief in some absolute, transcendent authority is that which
grounds confidence in our ability to override lower orders.
Confucius, however, despaired over finding a genuine chun-tzu (1989, Book IV: 6). He
despaired, because people everywhere failed in their responsibilities; everywhere the opposite of
our Heaven-mandated behaviour was compromised and violated. As a result, he felt more at
home with the barbarians, defined as those without a true understanding of the moral law, than
with his so-called civilization. A life informed by Heaven-defined jen (goodness), it turns out, is
not consistent with living in the real world. We can ask, how then can the real barbaric world
display more of what Heaven demands than the cultured world that is allegedly informed by
Heaven? If something about societies not organized around ideal world constructions can be
more genuinely moral, Confucius seems to be blind to the problem of interaction his explanatory
system creates.
Taoists, in contrast, do not seem blind to this problem and the relationship between
opposites, noting how the production of an opposite can be anticipated, implying that Confucians
should be aware of the problem. Taoists take the world, including the moral world, to be a play
of opposites, capturing the notion in the theory of yin/yang. The world is constituted of
opposites, where life and death, dark and light, good and bad, right and wrong, usefulness and
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uselessness, are in constant dynamic relation, such that attempts to eliminate one side of the
equation results in imbalance, in dysfunction, futility. Moral principles cannot be absolute from
this perspective. The Tao may be considered an absolute, but when we somehow reside in it, we
do not override, renounce, or command desire and emotion. My approach to oppositional
relations is, in part, inspired by Taoism, because it helps highlight how thinking in terms of
moral imperatives as absolutes creates a kind of blindness to problems generated by the theory.
However, I will not appeal to it to make my case but rather look to empirical evidence and
contemporary theories.
Natural Opposites
As Taoism anticipates, evolutionary and ecological theories describe the world in terms
of a play of opposites (see Levins and Lewontin, 1985). In ecosystems, construction/destruction,
affirmation/negation, prey/predator, host/parasite relations are constitutive. For organisms to
live, there must be destruction of other life and non-living forms. The structure of sources of
nutrition must be broken down in order to be utilized by the organism for its own growth and
survival. Evolution involves the emergence of new forms and species, which, because of
competition, involves the extinction of others. At more fundamental levels, it involves the
destruction of entire systems (e.g., of stars to form elements like iron).
Curiously, the once deemed “natural” opposition between reason and emotion is being
exposed as false. At neuronal levels, cognitive areas of the brain that enable reasoning are
connected to limbic systems (responsible for emotions, contributing to learning and the ability to
appreciate consequences) (Norden, 2007, Lecture 21, and Purves et al., 2001), indicating that
reasoning does not take place without some emotive component, at least with respect to decision
and action. As we discover how inter-connected structures and functions of the brain are, the
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reason vs. emotion opposition is exposed as artifactual. This has implications for how we analyze
lines of causality between thought and action. The straightforward relation between reason,
determination of principle, determination of will (in overriding emotion) and action cannot,
therefore, be the structure through which reasoning operates. Actual lines of causality must be
more complex and non-linear than that. Where ideal world prescriptions and imperatives assume
such linearity, they also, in principle, demand that agents act in ways in which they are incapable
(e.g., without regard for emotion). Moral failure figures into the equation, then, at fundamental
levels, because of a failure to understand just what constitutes an oppositional relation.
To the extent that we ignore natural oppositions and create false ones, lines of ethical
justification also become suspect. For instance, the idea that to have property x (e.g., intrinsic
value) justifies assigning the bearer of those properties an inherent right to life has become
fundamental to much ideal-world prescriptive ethics. However, it is not recognized by
ecosystems, evolution, or even a person’s own biology. To assert this kind of property, then, is to
fly in the face of counter-evidence. The related idea that we must respect the non-negotiable
status (absoluteness) of those to whom inherent right is ascribed, fails to take the complexity of
human life into account, as is evidenced by the fact that we must sometimes decide to place
people (soldiers and police officers) in situations where we know some will be killed. If the
context in which bearers of value of any kind evolves is complex, and is constituted by
oppositional relations, then the properties (including valuational ones) relevant to establishing
moral standing cannot be separated from natural properties. Hence, to act as if we can stand apart
from these properties and linearly determine what we ought to do courts failure in much the way
that caused Confucius to despair.
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Failure to recognize natural opposites results in processes like those that led to the Trump
electoral victory of 2016 in the U.S.A. Donald Trump exploited and, as of this writing, continues
to exploit, the anger and disenchantment of his follows by blaming environmental protectionists
and supporters of liberal immigration policies for their loss of jobs, their decline in prosperity,
for corruption in the federal capital, and for removing America from the world pedestal of
“greatness”. He has accused the champions of social and environmental justice of injustice, in
effect reversing the meaning of justice in response to the imposition (as he sees it) of policies and
laws that operate as imperatives to protect immigrants and the environment. By articulating his
position as one of righting the wrongs perpetrated on the workers of America, he has
appropriated the language of justice, inverted its meaning, and turned it against so-called
progressives. To appreciate the impact of such a reversal on the moral lives of U.S. citizens (and
the world), moral psychology becomes critical to ethics. When principles (of justice, for
instance) are imposed, some groups are disadvantaged. Feelings of resentment, anger, and the
need for revenge are generated because of feeling morally and politically violated, economically
disadvantaged, and culturally insulted. Those who feel violated are motivated to do and produce
the opposite of what the imposed measures of justice intend. Of course, this psychological turn
plays out in more than matters of immigration and environmental protection. We see it being
played out in the pro-life versus anti-abortionists conflict, liberals and conservatives, et cetera.
The more absolutist one side gets, the more the other side attempts to reverse the effects of the
imposition.
At another level, Nancy Ann Davis (1990) has argued that ideal world constructions and
related prescriptions systematically lead to hypocrisy. Since moral justifications for action are
detached from explanations of how people are actually motivated to act, there is no logical, and
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therefore, no coherent articulation of the connection between ideal world prescriptions and real
world mechanisms of action. Since ideal world prescriptions are not based on real world
motivations, people must pretend to act on them, while acting for other reasons; hence, the
hypocrisy. By implication, their actions are motivated by other forces, such as fear of sanction,
or anticipation of reward. Those who claim to act because of moral principle must, then,
construct cover stories to suppress and hide their actual motivations from themselves and others.
Unlike Kant, who could rely on the once powerful references to pure reason as his cover story,
today’s prescriptivists must increasingly rely on different means (e.g., dogmatic assertion), since
the metaethical eroding effects of physicalism have been so effective. The systematic and
hypocrisy Davis describes is more than ever becoming tolerated, similarly to how Harry
Frankfurt describes bullshit (Frankfurt, 2005). The distance between what we avow as reasons
for action and what are the actual reasons for action seems to be growing to such an extent that
members of Western society, at least, are having to adapt to the exigencies of life by, not only
tolerating, but by being hypocritical and using bullshit strategically.
What Then?
Does this imply that ethics can be trivialized and eliminated? I think not. For present
purposes, I must assume that alternative explanations for ethics and personhood can be given, not
explained away, even when we accept physicalism in its contemporary articulation. Explaining
today’s physicalism, however, is too complex a task for the space allotted. But I do want to claim
that it sheds new light on ethics and moral life as emergent functions, arising from the complex
structure and function of brains and evolving social relations (those dependent on language use).
Given the above, in order for ethics not to be self-defeating, moral thought cannot
separate the theoretical from the practical, as if metaethical considerations are not important to
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the practice of ethics. As explanations for what we call “person” and “agency” come under
review, moral psychology (moral causality) becomes increasingly important to the practice of
ethics, in determining what we can do, under what conditions we can do it, why we do what we
do, and why we formulate ideas concerning what we ought to do. In the history of the West, and
to a large extent the East, ethics has enjoyed a general agreement over what these concepts mean
(ethics as duty, persons as more closely related to the divine than the Earth), largely it seems,
because of generally accepted appeals to absolutes and the impressiveness of such appeals on
people’s psyches. This has helped establish a relatively stable set of metaethical concepts
grounding assertions about moral values and imperatives. Metaethical reflection on the nature of
personhood, agency, the good, ultimate foundations of justice, and the like, could then be
relegated to the more ethereal theoretical activity of scholars, whose conclusions were thought
not to bear immediately on practice.
But if my argument is sound, and the dominant way of thinking ethically itself leads to
moral failure, re-thinking metaethical foundations and thereby thinking differently ethically (in
non-absolutist, non-linear ways) are among the most important practical matters today. Indeed,
the very polarizing issues of abortion and euthanasia, as well as assisted suicide, underline the
need to re-think, since the resulting entrenchment of positions is leading advocates from both
sides of these debates to adopt evermore irrational and manipulative techniques (e.g.,
demonizing the opponents, misrepresenting opponents’ positions) to advance their own
positions. Erosion of communicative activity aimed at establishing mutual understanding,
agreement and unity is threatening to undermine our abilities to build robust moral communities.
To stand with those who maintain a focus on developing and sustaining robust moral
communities is to refocus on the task of attuning ourselves to the actual conditions that give rise
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to and support moral life, and to commit to developing mutual understanding of motivations and
values among interlocutors. Much of the task is empirical in nature, where we seek to understand
the physical and psychological conditions upon which moral life develops (evolves).
Communicative activity between interlocutors concerning interpretation and assigning of
meaning to actions, relationships, and the like becomes necessary to the building of protective,
reliable, caring communities. Communities protective of the goods of human life, then, need also
to become attuned to the conditions of flourishing. Such processes, I would argue, would likely
result in the three historically persistent ethical positions – utilitarianism, deontology and virtue
ethics – retaining their position at centre-stage of moral life, however incompatible they can
seem at times. What we find is that taking the approach just described results in interlocutors
valuing trustworthiness and reciprocity. Related expectations and senses of obligation arise to
help ensure that these values are recognized and exercised. But they also result from utilitarian
concerns, as interlocutors seek ways to guarantee the satisfaction of their values (interests). Of
course, the story is far more complex than I can present here, but this brief description indicates
how core elements of moral life could be identified, because they naturally arise among
interlocutors who find it useful to form communal life. Much more could be said, but at this
point it is sufficient to note that re-thinking ethics without traditional concepts and references to
absolutes is both possible and necessary.
For this paper, I only want to emphasize the importance of understanding and mutual
understanding in the development and protection of moral communities. Misunderstandings of
personhood, as when based on ideal world constructions, must be replaced by more explanatorily
intelligible and normatively non-absolute conceptions, in order to avoid the divisiveness current
conceptualizations engender. However, as we learn how persons are emergent functions of self-
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organizing systems (organisms), self-referring and evaluating systems, we are also learning that
they are perhaps more difficult to explain than traditional theories dreamt them to be. So, no
simple replacements for traditional conceptions can be expected. But we can retain certain
Kantian notions, such as that of the person as the unity of experience over time and of the unity
of multiple functions (perception, understanding, reflection, action). We need to be able to
explain and give meaning to this unity condition in new ways (not as autonomous self-legislator
and repository of intrinsic value). While avoiding the interaction problem, a new problem, that of
emergence, must now be addressed. How does a unity of experience over time that self-identifies
come to be? Do concepts such as autonomy, freedom, and will still have their place in a
“naturalized” ethic? If so, how are they to be formulated? Although these are questions for later
discussion, we can say that each is also a topic for moral deliberation, where we may need to
negotiate definitions as we continue to learn about the conditions that give rise to the use of these
concepts.
Many traditionally core moral concepts will likely remain core, precisely because we can
see how interlocutors who have a mutual interest in building and sustaining moral communities
would develop such concepts. The concept of agency, while understood differently, would
remain core as a focal point for assigning responsibility and trusting the locus of responsibility to
act with integrity; likewise with conceptions of freedom and moral decision-making. Once we
acknowledge that persons emerge in complex and inter-related systems, however, traditional
essentialist definitions become inadequate and perverse. Replacing essentialist definitions of core
concepts with relational definitions requires acceptance of some degree of experimentation in
and negotiating definitions.
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On the matter of mutual understanding, as we find that values, e.g., those related to
aggression and violence, may be intimately related to moral values; because of the play of
opposites, understanding one another becomes ever more central to moral life. If we find that the
opposite kinds of motivations are embedded in human psychology and sociology, we need first
to understand how even those generative of aggression and violence operate in us, not simply
proscribe them. Then, understanding their potential for re-valuation, for being controlled and
transformed becomes a central operation of moral life. This would be more in line with what we
actually do. Those things which gives rise to violence (anger, hatred, fear, aggression, desire to
dominate) are now often accepted as given motivations, which can, however, be transformed by
communities by appropriating the right to their expression from individuals and giving that right
over to cultural systems (e.g., as in “violent” sports), to political systems (e.g., in democracies
recognizing the need for oppositional parties), and to legal systems (e.g., by requiring
prosecutions and defence council).
Similar acts of appropriation are accomplished in various martial arts, which define the
appropriate form that those motivations are allowed to take. They do so by creating disciplines
and re-framing the values associated with violence (e.g., by valuing violence in defence of the
innocent and vulnerable as honourable). By re-framing violence and transforming its expression
in accordance with conceptions of right contexts, right manners and the like, it is transformed
into something socially valuable and productive. Plato (Republic 1973, Book II, 375 ff )
understood this as a measure that needed to be adopted in the training of the guardians, whose
high-spiritedness had to be disciplined through gymnastics and music (without which guardians
would tend to become savage). Indeed, Plato (or Socrates), perhaps ironically, demonstrates how
we need to become attuned to the actual forces that operate in life, in order to build moral
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communities. Through transformative processes, the high-spirited individual can be taught to be
gentle toward citizens of the state yet vicious toward its enemies. In keeping with commitment to
evidence-based propositions, Plaot uses the pedigree dog (375e) as a real-world proof that such a
union of opposites is possible. In many ways, the alternative ethic I am proposing already
operates today and in Confucius’ barbarians.
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